Safety Investigation Report 2018:1 Factual Information/1.1
SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT MH370 (9M-MRO)
1.1 HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT
1.1.1 Introduction
On 07 March 2014 at 1642 UTC[1] (0042 MYT, 08 March 2014), Malaysia Airlines (MAS) Flight MH370 Beijing-bound international scheduled passenger flight departed from Runway 32 Right, KL International Airport (KLIA) with a total of 239 persons on board (227 passengers and 12 crew). The aircraft was a Boeing 777-200ER, registered as 9M-MRO.
The Pilot-in-Command (PIC) signed in for duty at 1450 UTC [2250 MYT], 07 March 2014 followed by the First Officer (FO) who signed in 25 minutes later. The MAS Operations Despatch Centre (ODC) released the flight at around 1515 UTC [2315 MYT].
The PIC, an authorised examiner for the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA), Malaysia, was conducting the last phase of line training for the FO, who was transitioning to the Boeing 777 (B777) aircraft type from the Airbus A330. As the FO was certified functional during his last line training flight, no additional pilot was required as safety pilot on MH370. It has been established that the PIC had assigned the FO to be the Pilot Flying for this flight.
The PIC ordered 49,100 kilograms (kg) of fuel for the flight that gave an endurance of 07 hours and 31 minutes including reserves (as per computerised flight plan). The planned flight duration was 05 hours and 34 minutes.
The recorded radio transmissions between the Air Traffic Controllers at Kuala Lumpur Area Control Centre (KL ACC) and the FO showed that an airways clearance request to Lumpur Airways Clearance Delivery was made at 1625:52 UTC (0025:52 MYT) and a pushback and start clearance request to Lumpur Ground was made at 1627:37 UTC [0027:37 MYT] (0027:31 MYT).
Note:
In accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of MAS, radio communication on the ground is the responsibility of the FO. In the air, the role is reversed when the assigned pilot flying is the FO.
Lumpur Tower cleared MH370 for take-off at 1640:37 UTC (0040:37 MYT). At 1642:53 UTC (0042:53 MYT) Lumpur Departure cleared MH370 to climb to Flight Level (FL) 180 (the aviation term for 18,000 feet [ft.]) and to cancel the Standard Instrument Departure (SID) clearance by tracking direct to waypoint[2] IGARI.
At 1643:31 UTC (0043:31 MYT), KL ACC Sector 3 Planner coordinated with Ho Chi Minh (Viet Nam) Area Control Centre (HCM ACC) on the Direct Speech Circuit (direct telephone line) relaying the estimated time of arrival (ETA) of MH370 for waypoint IGARI as 1722 UTC (0122 MYT) and the assigned Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponder code A2157.
MH370 was transferred to Lumpur Radar at 1646:39 UTC (0046:39 MYT).
At 1646:58 UTC (0046:58 MYT), MH370 was cleared to climb to FL250 and subsequently to FL350 at 1650:08 UTC (0050:08 MYT). MH370 reported maintaining FL350 at 1701:17 UTC (0101:17 MYT) and reported maintaining FL350 again at 1707:56 UTC (0107:56 MYT).
At 1719:26 UTC (0119:26 MYT), MH370 was instructed to contact HCM ACC on the radio frequency 120.9 MHz.
At 1719:30 UTC (0119:30 MYT), MH370 acknowledged with “Good night Malaysian Three Seven Zero”. This was the last recorded radio transmission from MH370.
Radar recording showed that MH370 passed through waypoint IGARI at 1720:31 UTC (0120:31 MYT).
Based on the reconstruction of the flight profile conducted on the B777 simulator, the flight would be at waypoint IGARI one minute earlier than the original ETA of 1722 UTC (0122 MYT).
The Mode S symbol of MH370 dropped off from radar display at 1720:36 UTC (0120:36 MYT), and the last secondary radar position symbol of MH370 was recorded at 1721:13 UTC (0121:13 MYT).
The disappearance of the radar position symbol of MH370 was captured by the KL ACC radar at 1721:13 UTC (0121:13 MYT). The Malaysian military radar and radar sources from two other countries, namely Viet Nam and Thailand, also captured the disappearance of the radar position symbol of MH370. The Bangkok radar target drop occurred at 1721:13 UTC (0121:13 MYT) and Viet Nam’s at 1720:59 UTC [0120:59 MYT].
The last Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) (refer to Section 1.9.4 - ACARS) transmission was made through the aircraft’s satellite communication system at 1707:29 UTC (0107:29 MYT).
Figure 1.1A (below) shows the Chronological Sequence of Events of the Disappearance of MH370 (in pictorial form and not to scale)
Figure 1.1A – Chronological Sequence of Events of Disappearance of MH370 (in pictorial form and not to scale)
Source:
Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018
- ↑ Unless specified, all times in this report are in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The Malaysian Time (MYT) is UTC+08 hours.
- ↑ Waypoint - A specified geographical location used to define an area navigation route or the flight path of an aircraft employing area navigation. Waypoints are identified as either:
Note: In the printed Report, Figure 1.1A, 1.1B, 1.1C and 1.1D are positioned on pages which may not relate to the image or diagram. Each Figure has been placed in context when importing content to this website.
Pushback and start clearance request to Lumpur Ground was made at 0027:31 MYT and approved at 0027:37 MYT.
1.1.2 Actions by HCM ACC and KL ACC
At 1739:06 UTC [0139:06 MYT] HCM ACC queried KL ACC on the whereabouts of MH370. KL ACC contacted MAS ODC to check on the whereabouts of MH370.
HCM ACC had also contacted Hong Kong (China) ACC and Phnom Penh (Cambodia) ACC in an attempt to establish the location of MH370. However, no contact had been established by any of the ATC units.
Kuala Lumpur Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (KL ARCC) was activated at 2130 UTC [0530 MYT]. There is no evidence to show HCM ACC activated its Rescue Coordination Centre.
1.1.3 Diversion from Filed Flight Plan Route
1) Malaysian Military Radar
The Military radar data provided more extensive details of what was termed as “Air Turn Back”. It became very apparent, however, that the recorded altitude and speed change “blip” to “blip” were well beyond the capability of the aircraft. It was highlighted to the Team that the altitude and speed extracted from the data are subjected to inherent error. The only useful information obtained from the Military radar was the latitude and longitude position of the aircraft as this data is reasonably accurate.
At 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT] the Military radar showed the radar return of MH370 turning right but shortly after, making a constant left turn to heading of 273°, flying parallel to Airway M765 to VKB (Kota Bharu).
Between 1724:57 UTC [0124; 57 MYT] to 1737:35 UTC [0137:35 MYT] the “blip” (a spot of light on a radar screen indicating the position of a detected aircraft) made heading changes that varied between 8° and 20°, and a ground speed that varied from 451 kt to 529 kt. The Military data also recorded a significant height variation from 31,150 to 39,116 ft.
The Military data further identified the “blip” on a heading of 239° at 1737:59 UTC [0137:59 MYT] parallel to Airway B219 towards VPG (VOR Penang). Heading of this “blip” varied from 239° to 255° at a speed from 532 to 571 kt. The height of this “blip” was recorded between 24,450 ft and 47,500 ft.
At 1752:31 UTC [0152:31 MYT] the “blip” was observed to be at 10 nm south of Penang Island on a heading of 261°, speed of 525 kt and at a height of 44,700 ft.
At 1801:59 UTC [0201:59 MYT] the data showed the “blip” on a heading of 022°, speed of 492 kt and altitude at 4,800 ft. This is supported by the “blip” detected by Military radar in the area of Pulau Perak at altitude 4,800 ft at 1801:59 UTC [0201:59 MYT]. At 1803:09 UTC [0203:09 MYT] the “blip” disappeared, only to reappear at 1815:25 UTC [0215:25 MYT] until 1822:12 UTC [0222:12 MYT], about 195 nm from Butterworth, on a heading of 285°, speed of 516 kt and at an altitude of 29,500 ft.
The tracking by the Military continued as the “blip” was observed to be heading towards waypoint MEKAR on Airway N571 when it finally disappeared at 1822:12 UTC [0222:12 MYT], 10 nm after waypoint MEKAR.
On the day of the disappearance of MH370, the Military radar system recognised the ‘blip’ that appeared west after the left turn over IGARI was that of MH370. Even with the loss of SSR data, the Military long range air defence radar with Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) capabilities affirmed that it was MH370 based on its track behaviour, characteristics and constant/continuous track pattern/trend. Therefore, the Military did not pursue to intercept the aircraft since it was ‘friendly’ and did not pose any threat to national airspace security, integrity and sovereignty.
Based on the Malaysian Military data, a reconstruction of the profile was conducted on a Boeing 777 simulator. Figure 1.1B (below) in chart form shows the Profile Chart of Data from Malaysian Military Radar. Some of the speed and height variations were not achievable even after repeated simulator sessions.
It was also noted that, in the absence of autopilot or continuous manual control, an aircraft is very unlikely to maintain straight and level flight. Further, it is extremely unlikely for an aircraft to enter and maintain a turn and then return to straight and level flight for any significant period of time.
Figure 1.1B - Profile Chart of Data from Malaysian Military Radar (not to scale).
Source:
Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018
2) DCA Civilian Radar Data from Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport Runway
The aircraft diversion from the filed flight plan route was recorded on the DCA radar playback:
- a) From 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT] to 1744:52 UTC [0144:52 MYT] a primary aircraft target was captured by the Terminal Primary Approach Radar located to the south of the Kota Bharu – Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway.
- b) The appearance of an aircraft target on the KL ACC radar display, coded as P3362, was recorded at 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT] but the aircraft target disappeared from the radar display at 1737:22 UTC [0137:22 MYT].
- c) At 1738:56 UTC [0138:56 MYT] an aircraft target, coded as P3401, appeared on the KL ACC radar display and disappeared at 1744:52 UTC [0144:52 MYT].
- d) At 1747:02 UTC [0147:02 MYT] an aircraft target, coded as P3415, appeared on the KL ACC radar display but disappeared at 1748:39 UTC [0148:39 MYT], which appeared to be the continuity of the same target.
- e) At 1751:45 UTC [0151:45 MYT] an aircraft target, coded as P3426, appeared on the KL ACC radar display but disappeared at 1752:35 UTC [0152:35 MYT].
Figure 1.1C (below) shows Diversion from Filed Flight Plan Route (in pictorial form and not to scale).
Figure 1.1C - Diversion from Filed Flight Plan Route - Civilian Radar
(in pictorial form and not to scale)
Source:
Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018
1.1.3 (2)
It has been confirmed by DCA and its radar maintenance contractor, Advanced Air Traffic Systems (M) Sdn. Bhd. (AAT), that it was the 60 nm Terminal Primary Approach Radar, co-mounted with 200 nm monopulse SSR located to the south of Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway, which captured the above-mentioned primary aircraft targets.
Figure 1.1D (below) shows the suitable airports for emergency en-route diversion.
Figure 1.1D - Airports for Emergency Landing along the Flightpath of MH370 (chart not to scale)
Source:
Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018
1.1.3 (2)
Figure 1.1E (below) shows the Filed Flight Plan message of MH370.
Figure 1.1E - Filed Flight Plan message of MH370.
Source:
Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018
1.1.3 (2)
Figure 1.1F (below) shows Radar Data Plots (RDP) Tracks from the 60 nm Terminal Primary Approach Radar co-mounted with 200 nm monopulse SSR located to the south of Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway after Diversion and Figure 1.1G (below) shows RDP Tracks from Kuala Lumpur after take-off.
All the primary aircraft targets that were recorded by the DCA radar are consistent with those of the military data that were made available to the Investigation Team.
Note: Figure not included.
Figure 1.1F - Radar Data Plots (RDP) Tracks from the 60 nm Terminal Primary Approach Radar co-mounted with 200 nm monopulse SSR located to the south of Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway after Diversion.
Source: Advanced Air Traffic Systems (M) Sdn. Bhd. (AAT)
Note: Figure not included.
Figure 1.1G - Radar Data Plots (RDP) Tracks from Kuala Lumpur after take-off
Source: Advanced Air Traffic Systems (M) Sdn. Bhd. (AAT)
Reference:
The Malaysia Aeronautical Information Publication [AIP] ENR 1.6 dated 05 June 2008, AIP AMDT 2/2008 on the Provision of Radar Services and Procedures states that, in paragraph 1.1.4:
“In the Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu FIRs, radar services are provided using the following civil/military ATC Radars:
g) A 60 nm Terminal Primary Approach Radar co-mounted with 200 nm monopulse SSR located to the south of Kota Bharu - Sultan Ismail Petra Airport runway.”.
Figure 1.1H (below) shows the Radar Coverage Chart of Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu FIRs.
Note: Figure not included.
Figure 1.1H - Radar Coverage Chart of Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu Flight Information Regions
3) Ho Chi Minh Air Traffic Services
The tracking of MH370 was captured by HCM ACC Secondary Radar at Tan Son Nhut and at Camau Province, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast (ADS-B) located at Conson Island/range 270 nm) at 1711:59 UTC [0111:59 MYT] as it was heading for waypoint IGARI.
At 1720:59 UTC [0120:45 MYT] the “blip” from MH370 from both SSR and ADS-B radar position symbols disappeared from the radar display.
A visit was made to the office of the Vietnamese Civil Aviation Authority (CAAV) in Ho Chi Minh City on 10 September 2014. In interviews, the Duty HCM Duty ACC Controller who was handling MH370 on that night could not explain why he did not initiate any call to MH370 within the standard 5 minutes as specified in the Letter of Agreement (LOA) between Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia and Viet Nam Air Traffic Management dated 07 July 2001 and effective on 01 November 2001 (Refer Appendix 1.1A - Letter of Agreement between DCA Malaysia and Viet Nam). It was noted that he had only initiated an enquiry on the whereabouts of MH370 at 1739:03 UTC [0139:03 MYT] after a lapse of 12 minutes.
The Duty Controller however had stated that he had initiated calls to other aircraft on the existing frequency and on the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz. This was neither supported nor collaborated by any documents.
The landline recorded transcripts between KL ACC and HCM ACC suggested that there were confusions on the position of MH370. This was evident when HCM ACC requested KL ACC for information on MH370 at 1739:06 UTC [0139:06 MYT]. This conversation took place:
KL ACC: “MH370 already transferred to you rite?”
HCM ACC: “Yeah…yeah…I know at time two zero but we have no just about in contact up to BITOD…we have radar lost with him…the one we have to track identified via radar.”
When pointed out that neither HCM ACC SSR nor ADS-B showed any presence of a “blip” of MH370, the Duty Controller could not explain why he mentioned BITOD.
MH370 was operating within the Singapore FIR, in that portion of the airspace which has been delegated to Malaysia (Refer to Figure 2.2K - Singapore Airspace delegated to Malaysia) for the provision of air traffic services when the last air-ground radio contact was made at 1719 UTC [0119 MYT]. As such, KL ACC should be responsible for the alerting service which would mean that KL ACC would have to declare the Distress Phase at 1827 UTC [0227 MYT] when HCM ACC informed that there had been no two-way radio communications with MH37O.
The DETRESFA was only declared at 2232 UTC [0632 MYT]. Refer to para. 2.2.7 Table 2.2C, No. 26-28 - Chronology of ATC Events following the Disappearance of MH370; and to para. 2.2.8 1) o) - Activation of Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre, for details.
Reference:
Manual of Air Traffic Services, Part 9 - Emergencies, para. 9-6-5, Para, 6.7.2 dated 15/3/2009 states:
If alerting service is required for an aircraft that is flight planned to operate through more than one FIR including the airspace delegate to the Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu ATSCs and the position of the aircraft is in doubt, the responsibility for co-ordinating such service shall normally rest with the ATSC of the respective FIRs:
- within which the aircraft was flying at the time of last air-ground radio contact;
- that the aircraft was about to enter when last air-ground contact was established at or close to the boundary of two FIRs or control areas;
- within which the aircraft’s intermediate stop or final destination point is located:
- 1) if the aircraft was not equipped with suitable two-way radio communication, or
- 2) was not under obligations to transmit position reports.
and
ICAO Doc 4444 ATM/501 Procedures for Air Navigation - Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM), page 9-6, para 9.2.2.2, dated 22/11/07 states:
When alerting services is required in respect of a flight operated through more than one FIR or control area, and when the position of the aircraft is in doubt, responsibility for coordinating such service shall rest with the ATS unit of the FIR or control area within which the aircraft was flying at the time of last air-ground radio contact:
- a) that the aircraft was about to enter when last air-ground contact was established at or close to the boundary of two FIRs or control areas;
- b) within which the aircraft’s intermediate stop or final destination point is located:
- 1) if the aircraft was not equipped with suitable two-way radio communication, or
- 2) was not under obligations to transmit position reports.
Based on interviews, HCM ACC had stated that it did not initiate any emergency actions as it did not receive any change of the transfer of control time of IGARI, MH370 did not contact the Centre at the stated time, and it was unable to establish radio communication with MH370.
MH370 was also operating in the airspace delegated to KL ACC and the last air-ground radio contact was with KL ACC. Hence the provision of alerting service for MH370 rests with KL ACC.
These uncertainties were further compounded by the Duty Despatcher, based on MAS Flight Following System (FFS), who mentioned that the aircraft was over the Cambodian airspace when in fact the filed flight plan routing did not include flying over the Cambodian airspace.
Added to these confusions, for reasons best known to him, the MAS Captain from the Technical and Development Department, Flight Operations spoke to KL ACC saying that the aircraft did not leave the Malaysian airspace. When interviewed, the Captain insisted that he was asking a question rather than making a statement. This conversation was recorded at 0521.23 MYT:
KL ACC: “…had never leave Lumpur airspace?”
MAS Captain: “…yea he has not left Lumpur airspace because he has failed to call Ho Chi Minh.”
KL ACC Radar captured the disappearance of MH370 at 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT]. In interviews with the Duty KL ACC Radar Controller, he stated that he did not notice the “blip” disappearance as MH370 was out of radar coverage and would be in contact with HCM ACC after the transfer of responsibility was effected.
From 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT] to 1752:35 UTC [0152:35 MYT], what appeared to be MH370 was captured on KL ACC primary radar, coded as P3362, P3401, P1415, P3415
and P3426 (P signifies Primary Radar).
Figure 1.1C - Diversion from Filed Flight Plan Route.
The appearance of a “blip” coded as P3362 was recorded at 1730:37 UTC [0130:37 MYT)] but disappeared abruptly at 1737:22 UTC [0137:22 MYT].
At 1738:56 UTC [0138:56 MYT], a “blip” identified as P3401 was tracked by KL ACC but disappeared at 1744:52 UTC [0144:52 MYT].
Shortly after, another “blip” coded as P3451 appeared at 1747.02 UTC [0147:02 MYT] but disappeared at 1748:39 UTC [0148:39 MYT].
At 1751:45 UTC [0151:45 MYT], a “blip” coded as P3426 appeared south of Penang Island but disappeared at 1752:35 UTC [0152:35 MYT].
5) Medan Air Traffic Control Radar
The Medan ATC Radar has a range of 240 nm, but for unknown reasons, did not pick up any radar return bearing the SSR transponder code A2157 of MH370.
The Indonesian Military however stated that they picked up MH370 earlier as it was heading towards waypoint IGARI.
No other information was made available.
6) Bangkok Air Traffic Control Radar
The radar position symbol with SSR transponder code A2157 was detected on the Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Limited (AEROTHAI) radar display at 1711 UTC [0111 MYT] as the aircraft was tracking for waypoint IGARI.
Thailand DCA is a government agency whereas AEROTHAI is a state enterprise under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. AEROTHAI is the air navigation service provider responsible for the provision of Air Traffic Services within the Bangkok Flight Information Region (FIR).
As the flight plan of MH370 did not fall under the purview of Thailand’s FIR, Bangkok ACC did not pay attention to this flight. On playback of the radar recording it was noted that the radar position symbol of A2157 disappeared at 1721:13 UTC [0121:13 MYT].
7) Singapore Air Traffic Services
The Team visited Singapore to conduct interviews with officers from Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) and the Air Traffic Controllers on duty on 07 March 2014. The following were noted:
- i) Singapore ACC did not have radar coverage over the South China Sea. (ADS and CPDLC services are available to suitably equipped aircraft operating outside radar cover over the South China Sea …);
Reference:
AIP Singapore page 94 GEN 3.4-2, 10 MAR 11, para 3.2.2 d. - ii) At 2104:00 UTC [0504:00 MYT], Singapore ACC received a call from Hong Kong ACC enquiring any knowledge of a missing Malaysian aircraft MH370. Hong Kong ACC then requested assistance from Singapore ACC to contact Lumpur ACC for detailed information. It was evident that Singapore ACC was not aware of the problem until this call was received. Hong Kong ACC however had the knowledge of the missing Aircraft earlier after receiving unconfirmed information from HCM ACC;
- iii) At 2109:13 UTC [0509:13 MYT], Singapore ACC contacted Lumpur ACC to relay the query from Hong Kong ACC.
Reference
Radiotelephony transcripts between Singapore ACC and KL ACC Sector 3+5 Planner - Appendix 1.18G on Direct Line Coordination Communication, pages 109 to 114.
Source: Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018 Section 1.1 History of the Flight
______________________________________________
Footnotes
SSR (Secondary Surveillance Radar) - A surveillance radar system which uses transmitters/receivers system (interrogators) and transponders.
1.1.4 Role of Malaysian Military
On the day of the disappearance of MH370, the Military radar system recognised the ‘blip’ that appeared west after the left turn over IGARI was that of MH370. Even with the loss of SSR data, the Military long range air defence radar with Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) capabilities affirmed that it was MH370 based on its track behaviour, characteristics and constant/continuous track pattern/trend. Therefore, the Military did not pursue to intercept the aircraft since it was ‘friendly’ and did not pose any threat to national airspace security, integrity and sovereignty.
1.1.5 Detection of Hand Phone Signal
A Telco service provider in an interview with the RMP confirmed a signal “hit”occurred at 0152:27 MYT on 08 March 2014, coming from the mobile phone tower (LBS Location Base station) at Bandar Baru Farlim Penang. The signal “hit” however did not record any communication except to confirm that it wasin the ON mode signal related to the “hit”. The phone number xxxxxxx was later traced to that registered under the FO. This was supported by the RMP’s report.
To ascertain the probability of making calls inside an aircraft from different altitudes, a reconstructed flight using a King Air 350 over the said area and during the same time when the signal “hit” happened was carried out shortly after the disappearance of MH370. The flight was conducted from an altitude of 24,000 ft with step descents every 4,000 ft until 8,000 ft. The next descent was to 5,000 ft but at 1,000 ft interval. An expert from a Telco service provider conducted the test using three different brands of phone and related equipment that were carried on board the King Air 350. Test call will be automatically answered by the server in the event of connectivity.
In summary, during the tests, it was found that it was difficult to maintain successful call connectivity above 8,000 ft. However, one brand of phone was able to make a call at 20,000 ft. Only one cell phone service provider recorded the highest call attempts using their 3G network above 8,000 ft. Two service providers could only provide connection below 8,000 ft.
The Telco service provider expert cautioned the Team that the tests would be difficult to conclude and use as scientific/theoretical assumptions for the case of MH370, as the measurement results were only valid for that specific time, flight path, speed, altitude, devices used, and environment during the tests.
1.1.6 Search for Aircraft
Extensive work done by the MH370 Search Strategy Group, coordinated by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), by analysing signals transmitted by the aircraft’s satellite communications terminal to Inmarsat’s Indian Ocean Region satellite indicated that the aircraft continued to fly for several hours after loss of contact. The analysis showed the aircraft changed course shortly after it passed the northern tip of Sumatra (Indonesia) and travelled in a southerly direction until it ran out of fuel in the southern Indian Ocean west of Australia. Details of this work can be found in the ATSB’s report: AE-2014-054 dated 26 June 2014, and in subsequent updates, available at ATSB’s website:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2014/aair/ae-2014-054/
On 03 October 2017, the ATSB published a report detailing the history of the search and made conclusions and recommendations relating to the search activities. This is contained in the report titled “The Operational Search for MH370”. The report and relevant attachments are available at ATSB’s website:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/news-items/2017/chapter-closes-on-mh370/
The search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 commenced on 8 March 2014 and continued for 1,046 days until 17 January 2017 when it was suspended in accordance with a decision made by the Governments of Malaysia, Australia and the People’s Republic of China. This involved surface searches in the South China Sea, Straits of Malacca and the southern Indian Ocean. The 52 days of the surface search involving aircraft and surface vessels covered an area of several million square kilometres. A sub surface search for the aircraft’s underwater locator beacons was also conducted during the surface search. The underwater search started with a bathymetry survey which mapped a total of 710,000 square kilometres of Indian Ocean seafloor and continued with a high-resolution sonar search which covered an area in excess of 120,000 square kilometres. The last search vessel left the underwater search area on 17 January 2017 without locating the missing aircraft. Although combined scientific studies continued to refine areas of probability, there was no new information at that date to determine the specific location of the aircraft.
On 10 January 2018, the Malaysian Government entered into an agreement with the US company, Ocean Infinity, to conduct a 90-day underwater search in an area that was considered the most likely location for the wreckage. This search which commenced in the identified search area on 22 January 2018 was completed on 29 May 2018 without locating the missing aircraft. The search utilising the most advance underwater search technology currently available covered an area in excess of 112,000 square kilometres.
Details on the whole search effort for the aircraft have been documented elsewhere, in particular in the Australian Transport Safety Bureau report, “The Operational Search for MH370”, in relation to the search in the southern Indian Ocean and the weekly updates provided by the MH370 Response Team in relation to the re-activated search by Ocean Infinity, and are separate and distinct from this Safety Investigation Report.